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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction of this appeal lies in rhe Utah Court of 
Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §7^-2a-3(2)(e) in that 
this is an appeal from the District Court iji a criminal case not 
involving a first or a capital degree felony. 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal of a criminal conviction of Defendant on 
four courts of theft and from the denial of 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
a new trial, 
Did trial counsel!s numerous failures of trial preparation 
and investigation fall below an objective standard of reasonable-
ness and amount to constitutionally ineffective assistance of 
counsel requiring a new trial where such failures included the 
following: 
1. Failure to obtain and examiiie available material 
evidence critical to his clients main defense which deprived the 
Defendant of the use of exonerating evidence at trial. 
2. A nearly complete failure to 
factual defenses prior to trial. 
3. Failure to examine all of thi relevant and material 
evidence held by the prosecution when the prosecution several 
times offered to allow such examination prior to trial. 
investigate potential 
4. Failure properly to prepare 
nesses for trial. 
himself and his wit-
5. Failure to produce a key witness and to elicit 
crucial testimony at trial. 
Is there a reasonable probability that, but for the coun-
sel's unprofessional errors, the result of the trial would have 
been different? 
Was the trial Courts inclusion, without a cautionary in-
struction in its charge to the jury of a civil statute admitted 
into evidence forbidding acts with which the Defendant was not 
charged, prejudicial error requiring a new trial? 
Was instruction No. 25 to the Jury so misleading and confus-
ing as to amount to prejudical error requiring a new trial? 
Did the trial court err in failing to instruct the jury with 
regard to specific intent? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
U.S. Const. Amend. VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right . . . to have the assistance of counsel for his defense. 
U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV 
. nor shall any state deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . . 
Utah Const. Art. I, §12 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel . . . . 
Utah Const. Art. I, §7 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law. 
_9 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction on four counts of second 
degree felony theft, from the judgment entered pursuant to that 
conviction and from the denial of Defendant-Appellantfs Motion 
for a New Trial. 
This case was initiated by information filed March 14, 1985 
charging five counts of second degree felony theft. 
The preliminary hearing was held May 8, 1985 at which 
hearing Count 5 of the information was dismissed (Record 
at 4, 5). 
The Defendant was arraigned on June 6, 1985 (R at 27). From 
the arraignment in June of 1985 to trial iji July of 1987 trial 
dates were set and vacated four times. This trial was set to be 
heard on September 25, 1985 (R at 27), February 19, 1986 (R at 
37), June 4, 1986 (R at 38), April 7, 1987 (R at 46), and July 7, 
1987 (R at 57). 
Trial was held during the four days Jxjily 7 through July 11, 
1987 with the jury returning verdicts of (guilty on all four 
remaining counts. (R at 80-84) 
Defendant's motion for a new trial w^s filed October 23, 
1987, immediatel}?- after he was committed to prison. The trial 
court denied Mr. Crestanifs Motion for New|Trial on November 23, 
1987 (R at 5, T. Nov. 23, p. 3). 
The notice of appeal was filed thereafter on November 23, 
1987. (R at 224-230, T. Nov 23, p. 7). 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Over the years the Defendant, James Crestani, worked 
his way up in the organization of Alta Title Company in Salt Lake 
City, Utah until by 1980 he had acquired 100Z of the stock of 
that corporation. (T. Vol. IV to p.p. 502, 503) 
2. On February 10, 1982 Alta Title Company opened a bank 
checking account at Sandy State Bank, Sandy, Utah, which account 
was known as MMD-2 (Exhibit 17-P). 
3. MMD-2 was one of several accounts used by Alta Title 
Company. It was in existence for approximately 13 months until 
March of 1983 when Alta Title ceased doing business. (Defendant 
Exhibit 1-d, p. 4) . 
4. MMD-2 was an active commercial banking account which 
during 1982 experienced hundreds of deposits and disbursements 
amounting to millions of dollars in transactions in some months. 
(Exhibits IIP, 17P, 18P, 20P, 21P, 22P, 23P, 24P, T. Vol. II p. 
158-161) 
5. Although opened as a commercial account in the name of 
Alta Title the account was initially opened with a $10,000.00 
deposit from the personal funds of Defendant Crestani (T. Vol. 
Ill p. 412) and during the life of the account numerous other 
deposits of funds owned by or due to Defendant Crestani were made 
into MMD-2. (T. Vol. Ill, p.p. 410-412, 416, 417, T. Vol. IV, p. 
508, 509, Defendants Exhibit 1-d). 
a n . i <«r_Q //. 
-4-
6. In March of 1985 James Crestani wks charged in a five 
count information with theft of monies from the MMD-2 account. 
(R at 21-23) (A fifth count involving anothjer account was later 
dismissed. R at 7) 
7. The gist of the charges contained in the information 
was that on four occasions in 1982 (on May 7, May 18, June 11 and 
August 13) the Defendant had withdrawn amounts from the MMD-2 
account and used the money for his own personal benefit. It was 
further implied in the Probable Cause Statement appended to the 
information that this conduct constituted t 
an account used exclusively for funds held 
estate closings and therefore, by the very 
the Defendant had stolen escrow monies. (R 
8. Shortly after the information wa^ 
Defendant Crestani approached Mr. Phil L. 
(ntrial counsel") and requested trial couns 
this case. Trial counsel agreed to do so 
$50,000.00. Trial counsel agreed to accep 
heft because MMD-2 was 
in escrow for real 
fact of withdrawal, 
at 23) 
filed in this matter 
Hansen, Attorney, 
^1 to represent him in 
for a flat fee of 
t a cash downpayment 
toward the fee with the rest payable over time secured by a note 
and a pledge of personal property to be h^! 
(Affidavit of James V. Crestani, R at 284, 
9. In his initial conversations wit|h trial counsel, Mr, 
Crestani told trial counsel that his defense to the charges was 
that the money withdrawn from MMD-2 was personal money belonging 
to Mr. Crestani. (Affidavit of James V. Crestani, R at 285). 
Id by trial counsel, 
285) 
10. Mr. Crestani described to trial counsel the large 
amount of preparation and auditing of the MMD-2 account that Mr. 
Crestani felt was necessary to prepare this case for trial, 
trial counsel assured Mr. Crestani that he would do a thorough 
and more than adequate job and that for the stated fee trial 
counsel would identify and interrogate all witnesses, thoroughly 
review all bank accounts involved including all relevant deposits 
and withdrawals. Trial counsel assured Mr. Crestani that he 
would travel to California to prepare Mr. Crestani and his wife 
for their testimony at trial and would hire paralegals to prepare 
witnesses and exhibits, thoroughly research the case law and 
perform all other efforts necessary to prepare the case for trial 
properly and adequately. (Affidavit of James V. Crestani, R at 
285) 
11. After he was hired by Mr. Crestani, trial counsel was 
approached by one James A. Mclntyre, an attorney who had 
previously represented Mr. Crestani and Alta Title Company. Mr. 
Mclntyre related to trial counsel his opinion that a proper 
defense to the charges leveled against Mr. Crestani absolutely 
required a thorough review and audit of all available records 
pertaining to deposits and withdrawals of Mr. Crestanifs personal 
funds into and out of MMD-2. (Affidavit of James A. Mclntyre, R 
at 298) 
12. Mr. Mclntyre further offered his services and those of 
Mr. Gary Carlson, a former vice president of Alta Title, to 
-6-
90:lv-3M 
to trial did he use 
Carlson. (Mclntvre 
assist trial counsel in searching for and reviewing all of the 
MMD-2 records including all deposits and withdrawals. (Mclntyre 
Affidavit, R at 298) 
13. Trial counsel acknowledged Mr. MbIntyre's offer but 
neither at that time nor at any time prior 
the offered services of Mr. Mclntyre or Mr J 
Affidavit, R at 298, Affidavit of Gary Carlion, R at 206, 207) 
14. Approximately two months after the information was 
filed, a preliminary hearing was held. (R it 4) 
15. At the preliminary hearing the Defendant Crestani was 
bound over on four counts of felony theft. (R at 5) Trial 
counsel called no witnesses at the preliminary hearing. (R at 4, 
5) 
16. Between the preliminary hearing iii May of 1985 and the 
trial two years later in June of 1987, the ^ Defendant Crestani and 
his wife attempted on numerous occasions to 
by telephone or letter regarding this case 
were unsuccessful and Mr. Crestani was unable to either speak 
with trial counsel or get him to return vzritten correspondence or 
telephone calls. (James V. Crestani Affidavit, R at 285, Supple-
mental Affidavit of James V. Crestani, R at 259, 260) 
17. This case was originally set for trial on September 25, 
1985, (R at 27) thereafter it was continue^ four times. (R at 
27, 38, 46, 57) 
contact trial counsel 
All such attempts 
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18. For the trial setting February 19, 1986, counsel 
appeared for pre-trial two weeks prior thereto on February 4, 
1986. (R at 38) At that time trial counsel had not obtained the 
MMD-2 records from Sandy State Bank. 
19. On March 16, 1987, trial counsel prepared and served on 
the prosecutor a demand for discovery. (R at 50, 51) Included 
in the demand was a request for "an itemization of all physical 
evidence, including a list of all exhibits the prosecution 
intends to introduce at the time of trial.ff (R at 50, 51) 
20. Also on March 16, 1987 trial counsel had prepared and 
served upon Sandy State Bank a subpoena requesting production of 
certain MMD-2 records (R at 52, 53) and a notice of records 
deposition. (R at 54, 56) These records were not delivered at 
the appointed time because trial counsel failed to pay the 
copying charges requested by the bank. (Affidavit of Shirlene 
Ivory, R at 274) 
21. For the trial setting of April 7, 1987, trial counsel 
prepared and filed with the court a Motion, Stipulation and Order 
of Continuance on March 31, 1987, one week prior to trial. (R at 
58-60) At that time trial counsel had not obtained the records 
of the MMD-2 account. (Affidavit of Shirlene Ivory, R at 274) 
22. The pretrial preparation of Mr. Crestanifs defense 
prior to trial was primarily undertaken by a paralegal working in 
trial counsel's office. (Affidavit of Shirlene Ivory, R at 
272-276) All contacts with Mr. Grestani prior to the day before 
-8-
on . i ,T_Q //. 
trial were through this paralegal or trial counsel1s secretary, 
(Supplemental Affidavit of James V. Crestani, R at 260). 
Defendant Crestani several times told the paralegal that the 
MMD-2 records would be important to his defense (Ivory Affidavit. 
R at 272). The paralegal assured Mr. Crestani that trial counsel 
would obtain the MMD-2 records. (Id.) 
23. Five weeks prior to trial, the palralegal attempted to 
pull the office file for trial counsel to assist him in pre-trial 
preparation. Apparently, however, trial counsel was out of the 
office for long periods of time in the weeks preceding trial and 
apparently trial counsel did not review th^ case file till two 
days before the trial began. (Affidavit of Shirlene Ivory, R at 
271). Defendant Crestani told the paralegal he was very con-
cerned that trial counsel was not prepared to go to trial and 
that they should request a continuance. (Id. R at 274, 275). 
When the paralegal relayed Mr. Crestanifs concerns, trial counsel 
assured the paralegal that he was prepared. 
24. Some weeks before trial, the pari* 
collect the bank records previously subpoenaed by trial counsel. 
(Ivory Affidavit, R at 274) However, the pank records had not 
been paid for and had subsequently been lost. (Ivory Affidavit, 
R at 274) The paralegal reordered the records that had pre-
viously been subpoenaed and these records were picked up two days 
prior to the beginning of the trial. (Id.) 
(Id. R at 275). 
alegal attempted to 
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25. The MMD-2 account records subpoenaed by trial counsel 
included only deposit items into that account for March, April, 
May and June of 1982. Trial counsel did not request monthly 
statements, checks or disbursement items, or credit and debit 
memos. Trial counsel did not subpoena any records at all for the 
months of July and August, 1982, which encompassed count four of 
the information. (R at 52,. 54, 55) 
26. Trial Counsel apparently began his preparation of the 
witnesses that he would later call at trial only two days prior 
to the day the trial was to begin. He first contacted defense 
witness Gary Carlson two days before trial. (Affidavit of Gary 
Carlson, R at 205) He first contacted defense witness James 
Mclntyre the day before trial at which time trial counsel was 
apparently preparing for a portion of the case that had been 
dismissed at preliminary hearing. (Affidavit of James A. 
Mclntyre, R at 298) 
27. Trial counsel received, both directly and through his 
paralegal, offers from the prosecutor to examine the documentary 
evidence held by the state prior to trial. (Affidavit of 
Shirlene Ivory, R at 273, T. Vol. Ill, p. 443) 
28. On at least two occasions prior to trial the prosecutor 
offered to make available to trial counsel all of the documentary 
evidence that the prosecution had developed for trial. Further, 
the prosecutor offered to go over the documents with trial 
counsel and provide an investigator familiar with the case to go 
through them with him. (T. Vol. Ill, p. 443) 
29. Trial counsel never took the prosecutor up on these 
offers and, in the two years between preliminary hearing and 
trial, never reviewed the state's evidence including many of the 
account records of MMD-2. (Trans. Vol. IV ^ . 443, T. Vol, 12 and 
17, p. 42) 
30. On the evening before trial, trial counsel finally met 
with Defendant Crestani and his wife. (Supplemental Affidavit of 
James V. Crestani, R at 259, 260) At that time Mr. Crestani 
observed that trial counsel had only obtained deposit items for a 
four month period from the MMD-2 account. He asked trial counsel 
where the rest of the account records were. Trial counsel re-
sponded, "That's all we need. They don't h^ve a case." (Id. at 
260) 
31. That same night Defendant Crestani asked trial counsel 
why he had not secured the attendance of Blake Hammond, a former 
vice-president of Alta Title Company relocated to Phoenix, 
Arizona, whom Mr. Crestani had felt was an important witness. 
Mr. Hammond resided in Phoenix, Arizona. Trial counsel admitted 
that he had not subpoenaed Blake Hammond but told Mr. Crestani 
that in trial counsel's opinion they did not need Mr. Hammond for 
the case. (Supp. Affidavit of James V. Cre* 
Hammond was never contacted by trial counsel 
about the trial date and did not appear at the trial. (Affidavit 
of Blake Hammond. R at 202) 
stani, R at 261) Mr. 
1, was never informed 
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32. Prior to trial, the Defendant's wife Vickie R. Crestani 
was not told by trial counsel that she would be a witness not-
withstanding the fact that she had been the Escrow Department 
Manager at Alta Title Company in 1982 and had been in charge of 
some deposits made into MMD-2. (T. Vol. Ill p. 408, Record 
Affidavit of Vickie Crestani R at 308) 
33. In his opening statement at trial, made after the 
State's case, trial counsel outlined his case for the defense. 
Trial counsel relied heavily on the fact that he would show that 
Defendant Crestani had personal money in MMD-2 sufficient to 
cover the withdrawals that were charged in the information. (T. 
Vol. Ill, p. 312-315, 320-322, 326) 
34. At trial, trial counsel called attorney James A. 
Mclntyre as a witness for the defense. (T. Vol. Ill, p. 340) 
35. Trial counsel attempted to establish through the 
testimony of Mr. Mclntyre several deposits of Mr. Crestani1s 
personal funds into MMD-2. (T. Vol. Ill at 346-349) Mr. 
Mclntyre was unable to recall several of the transactions and 
others he could recall generally but could not specify dates or 
exact amounts. (Id.) Trial counsel did not provide Mr. Mclntyre 
with any documents of deposit to substantiate his testimony or 
refresh his recollection. (T. Vol. Ill, p. 346-350) 
36. At trial, trial counsel called Vickie R. Crestani, wife 
of the Defendant and former Escrow Department Manager for Alta 
Title Company. (T. Vol. Ill, p. 408) 
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37. Trial counsel attempted to have krs. Crestani verify 
deposits of Jim Crestani1s personal funds into MMD-2 during 1982 
from her own memory without reference to specific records, (T. 
Vol. Ill, p. 411, 412 and 419-421) 
38. On cross-examination the Prosecutor pointed out that 
Mrs. Crestani was testifying only from mempry and that she had 
had many years to locate the records of the 
testified about on direct examination. (T 
39, Trial counsel also had Mrs. Crestani identify specific 
funds deposited into 
, p. 409, 414, 416) 
Prosecutor confronted 
deposit item records representing personal 
MMD-2 for Defendant Crestani. (T. Vol. Ill 
40. On further cross-examination, the 
Mrs. Crestani with records showing that the deposits she had 
testified to on direct examination were immediately withdrawn 
from MMD-2 and thus not available to ccjver the charged 
withdrawals. (T. Vol. Ill, p. 436-439) 
41. Trial counsel objected to cross-examination of Mrs. 
Crestani using bank records of disbursements on the ground that 
he had not previously seen or been given 
examine those documents. (T. Vol. Ill, ppJ 
cution responded that trial counsel had indeed been offered the 
opportunity to examine all the state's evidence. (Id.) 
42. After trial counsel's objection on Thursday night, the 
court recessed for the evening and instructed trial counsel and 
the Prosecutor to go over the bank records! that the Prosecutor 
deposits that she had 
Vol. Ill, p. 425) 
an opportunity to 
441-449) The prose-
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intended to use to cross-examine Mrs. Crestani. (T. Vol. Ill, p. 
449) Trial counsel admitted that he had never seen these partic-
ular documents before. (T. Vol. Ill, p. 452) 
43. On further cross-examination the next day the Prosecutor 
was able to establish from documentary evidence that Mrs. 
Crestani withdrew a previously described $15,000.00 deposit on 
the same day that it was deposited into MMD-2. (T. Vol. IV, pp. 
470, 471) Mrs. Crestani, because she had not reviewed any bank 
documents except some deposit items subponeaed by trial counsel, 
was surprised and did not recall the immediate withdrawal of the 
$15,000.00 until the Prosecutor showed her the disbursement item 
on the last day of trial. (T. Vol. IV, p. 472) 
44. On further cross-examination the Prosecutor was able to 
show that another deposit, described by Mr. Crestani as personal 
funds of the Defendant, in the amount of $19,896.73 was likewise 
withdrawn on the same day. (T. Vol. IV, pp. 474-477) 
45. On further cross-examination of Mrs. Crestani, the 
Prosecutor was able to establish that many of the $50.00 agent 
fees that the defense claimed were personal funds of Mr. Crestani 
were withdrawn from the MMD-2 account and paid to the Alta Title 
General account. (T. Vol. IV, pp. 480-484) 
46. In his closing argument the prosecutor told the jury 
that the Crestanis knew that the deposits they testified about on 
direct examination were immediately withdrawn and the Defendant 
and his wife were merely trying "to pull the wool over [the 
jury's] eyes". (T. Vol IV, p. 571) 
_ i /. _ 
MMD-2 at various 
from his personal 
47. At trial, trial counsel called th^ Defendant Crestani 
as a witness. (T. Vol. IV, p. 500) 
48. Trial counsel attempted to show with the testimony of 
Mr. Crestani that he had personal funds in 
times. However, except for small deposits, 
account, Mr. Crestani was only able to testify from memory 
because no documents were provided to establish exact deposits. 
(T. Vol. IV, p. 510) 
49. At trial the court, hearing no objection from Defen-
dant's counsel, allowed the prosecutor to question witnesses 
about the co-mingling of personal and escrow funds in MMD-2 by 
Vol IV, p. 524) 
secutor pointedly 
^ing the co-mingling 
trial counsel and 
Defendant Crestani. (T. Vol III, p. 361, T. 
50. In his closing argument the Pros 
referred to the text of the statute prohibi) 
of escrow funds which had been offered by 
received in evidence by the court. (T. Vol IV, pp. 553-574) 
Defendant Crestani was not charged with any specific offense 
involving co-mingling of funds. 
51. At trial the Prosecutor elicited, without objection, 
testimony from several witnesses that Defendant Crestani had 
obtained or paid to Alta Title Co. the interest earned on escrow 
funds deposited into MMD-2 over to Alta Title. (T. Vol III, p. 
479, T. Vol. IV, p. 526) Defendant Crestanij 
theft of interest monies. 
was not charged with 
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52. Mr. Crestani was convicted of all four counts of second 
degree felony theft. He was sentenced and committed to prison on 
October 23, 1987. (R at 191) 
53. After the sentencing, new counsel for Mr. Crestani 
hired a CPA to perform a review of the MMD-2 account. (T. Nov. 
12 and 17, p. 5) The CPA prepared two reports which were submit-
ted to the court. The first report was submitted in open court* 
and the Prosecutor agreed to its being considered as an Affida-
vit. (T. Nov. 12 and 17, p. 6) That report was not appended to 
the record but is contained in the evidence box marked "Defen-
dant's Exhibit l-dff. The second report was submitted to the 
court on November 17, 1987 and appears in the record at 302-304. 
In addition, the CPA gave testimony in support of Defendant 
Crestani's Motion for a new trial. (T. Nov. 12 and 17, p. 25-32) 
54. In his review of the MMD-2 account the CPA found 
records that substantiate that on June 28, 1982 Mr. Crestani 
deposited $24,622.50 from his personal funds into MMD-2. (Ex. 
1-d, T. Vol. VI, p. 30) These funds were owed to Mr. Crestani 
personally as a loan repayment from one Raymond D. Fry. (Id., 
Affidavit of Raymond J. Fry, R at 252, 253) These funds were 
still in the MMD-2 account on August 13, 1982 when the $16,500.00 
withdrawal, which was the basis for Count 4 of the information, 
was made. (T. Nov. 12 and 17, p. 30) 
55. In addition, the CPA found that $50,000.00 of Mr. 
Crestani1s personal funds which should have been deposited into 
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MMD-2 per his instructions were in fact deposited by Mr. 
Crestanifs attorney James A. Mclntyre into an account at Sandy 
State Bank entitled MAlta Title Contract Servicing Account11 on 
August 5, 1982. (Defendants Ex. 1-d, p. 41) The CPA found no 
evidence that this deposit was never withdrawn up to and includ-
ing the time when Alta Title closed its doors in March, 1983. 
(Id.) 
56. In addition, the CPA found records that confirmed that 
$8,865.43 was deposted into MMD-2 on September 28, 1982. These 
funds were personal funds due to James Cresljani. (R at 303) 
57. In addition, the CPA found that 
funds due to James Crestani upon the sale 
Building were available to Mr. Crestani in 
pver $500,000.00 of 
of the Alta Title 
982 which funds were 
deposted in bank accounts maintained by Alta Title. (R at 303) 
58. In his closing argument the Prosecutor emphasized that 
guilty intent on the part of Mr. Crestani was established because 
he had made no attempt to repay the monies yithdrawn from MMD-2, 
(T. Vol. IV, p. 562), that the Defendant h^d failed to produce 
documentary evidence to substantiate that 
personal funds in the accounts sufficient tb cover the disburse-
ments he was charged with (T. Vol. IV, p. 573), and that in each 
specific instance where the Defendant Crestani claimed the 
deposits were made in MMD-2, those funds were immediately with 
Mr. Crestani had 
drawn and therefore not available to cover 
drawals. (T. Vol. IV, p. 571) 
the charged with-
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59. During its deliberations the jury sent out a written 
message to the court which stated "Was the money 16,500 put back 
into MMD-2H. (This record is maintained and unmarked in the 
evidence box. A copy is attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit A.) 
The court responded "refer to your collective memories11. (I_d. T. 
Vol IV P. 609, 610) 
60. The CPA found that prior to the date of the last count 
of the information, by which time Defendant Crestani was alleged 
to have stolen Fifty Seven Thousand Three Hundred Dollars 
($57,300.00), the sum of Seventy Six Thousand Six Hundred One 
Dollars and Twenty Three Cents ($76,601.23) representing personal 
funds of the Defendant Crestani had been deposited by or for 
Crestani into MMD-2. The CPA also found that additional personal 
funds of Defendant Crestani were deposited into MMD-2 subsequent 
to August 13, 1982. (Defendant's Ex. 1-d, p. 4) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Minimal standards of criminal justice and due process 
require that defense counsel in a criminal case adequately 
prepare for trial by gathering as much information as possible 
about the case, including possible defenses. Where, as in this 
case, defense counsel is informed at the outset that his client's 
major defense may be proved or supported by an examination of 
bank account records, defense counsel's duty to thoroughly 
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examine those records and present at triall such exculpatory 
records as he is able to find is even more compelling. 
Defense counsel's utter failure to perform any significant 
investigation of the relevant records on the MMD-2 account fell 
far below the minimum standards set forth above and prevented 
Defendant Crestani from presenting evidence at trial that would 
have completely exonerated him under one count of the information 
and substantially supported good defenses | to the remaining 
counts. 
Numerous other failures of investigation and failures of 
preparation exacerbated the problem of ineffective assistance of 
counsel and provide ample evidence of triaJL counsel's lack of 
diligence in the case. 
This lack of diligence can in no way bfe called mere strate-
gy. It is clear that trial counsel relied heavily at trial on 
the very defense that his failure of preparation prevented him 
from establishing. The circumstances surrounding trial counsel's 
belated, hurried and error-ridden preparation belie any claim 
that he intentionally avoided for tactical Reasons a full inves-
tigation of the MMD-2 account. 
In this case, even a brief examination 
accounts performed after sentencing by new 
discovery of deposits that would have exonerated the Defendant 
from guilt on one count. Other personal (funds of Defendant 
Crestani that were discovered to have been (deposited into MMD-2 
of MMD-2 and related 
counsel resulted in 
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or that were available to him in other accounts provide strong 
evidence that would have supported Defendant Crestanifs defense 
of mistake or lack of intent to permanently deprive. The evi-
dence obtained after trial establishes much more than a reason-
able probability that the result at trial would have been differ-
ent but for counsel's failures. 
At trial, trial counsel further failed in his duty to assert 
legal defenses and objections to protect his client's rights. 
The prosecutor frequently and consistently elicited testimony 
regarding co-mingling of funds and unauthorized appropriation of 
interest monies from MMD-2, which uncharged misconduct evidence 
was severely prejudicial and objectionable under Rules 403 and 
404 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. The admission of this testi-
mony was severly prejudicial to the Defendant's right to a fair 
trial and trial counsel's failure to object thereto falls below 
standards for minimum competency of representation. 
The instructions given to the jury in this case were ex-
tremely confusing and prejudicial to the rights of the Defendant 
Crestani. One instruction (No. 25) virtually required conviction 
if the jury found that MMD-2 had been used as an escrow account 
(which the Defendant admitted). 
Another instruction (No. 16) specifically outlined numerous 
unlawful acts involving escrow accounts, co-mingling of funds and 
use of interest from escrow accounts. The prosecutor during 
trial elicited testimony from numerous witnesses that each of 
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an.-Ur-'}//. 
by trial counsel were 
t refused to instruct 
|to sustain a theft 
these acts occurred at Alta Title during the relevant time 
period. However, none of these alleged unlawful acts contributed 
directly to proof of the counts charged and no cautionary in-
struction was given. The combination of these instructions was 
extremely unfair and prejudicial to Defendant Crestani. These 
improper instructions were excepted to by trial counsel and the 
failure to exclude them justifies a new trial. 
Other essential instructions requested! 
improperly rejected by the Court. The Cour|t 
the jury on the specific intent required 
conviction. This lack of proper instruction also justifies a new 
trial. 
The evidence is overwhelming that trial counsel's lack of 
effective and necessary preparation and investigation and the 
resultant unavailability of evidence establishing good defenses 
to the charges, exacerbated by the admission of extremely preju-
dicial and inadmissible evidence at trial and the giving of 
misleading and unlawful instructions to tlje jury, combined to 
allow an unjust conviction of this defendant in what must be 
described as a gross miscarriage of justiqe. These errors may 




TRIAL COUNSEL'S TRIAL PREPARATION FELL FAR BELOW 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD OF REPRESENTATION AND RESULTED 
IN THE UNJUST CONVICTION OF DEFENDANT 
The right to the effective assistance of counsel is funda-
mental to American concepts of constitutional liberty and is 
"rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people1'. Alires 
v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 118, 121, 449 P.2d 241, 243 (1969). In 
modern case law, the emphasis on effective assistance is evident 
and the mere appearance of an attorney on behalf of an accused 
does not satisfy the constitutional standard. The Utah Supreme 
Court has observed that an accused 
is entitled to the assistance of a competent 
member of the Bar, who shows a willingness to 
identify himself with the interests of the 
accused and present such defenses as are 
available under the law and consistent with 
the ethics of the profession. 
State v. McNichol, 554 P.2d 203, 204 (Utah 1976) (emphasis 
added). 
If an attorney at trial is ignorant of facts or law which 
would constitute a defense, the trial is reduced to a farce and a 
sham. Such circumstances constitute inadequate or ineffective 
assistance of counsel. State v. Pierren, 582 P.2d 69, 70-71 
(Utah 1978). The ineffective assistance of counsel is a "depar-
ture from due process of law" and requires a remand for new 
proceedings. Alires, 449 P.2d at 243. 
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In the trial of this case, trial counsel was completely 
ignorant of numerous facts constituting complete or substantial 
defenses to the charged counts because he failed to perform even 
the most cursory examination of the records <pf the MMD-2 account. 
This failure is shocking in light of the fact that trial counsel 
was informed at the outset that Mr. Crestani believed his primary 
defense to be that he had deposited sufficient funds into the 
MMD-2 account to cover the charged withdrawals. 
It is incumbent upon every criminal defense lawyer to 
investigate with reasonable thoroughness all| 
exculpatory factual defenses. 
areas of potentially 
It is the duty of the lawyer to cbonduct a 
prompt investigation of the circumstances of 
the case and to explore all avenues leading 
to facts relevant to the merits of the case 
American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice, Defense 
Function, 4-4.1 
It is an elementary principle that wheti defense counsel is 
pointed to an available body of records and informed by his 
client that those records contain the proof of his innocence, 
counsel's duty to thoroughly examine those records to confirm his 
defendant's claim is even more compelling. 
The United States Supreme Court has set] forth the standard, 
according to the effective assistance of counsel and due process 
rights guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
-?*U 
U.S. Constitution, against which criminal counsel's 
representation must be measured. Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.ed. 2nd, 674 (1984). Under this 
standard, any defendant claiming ineffective assistance of 
counsel has the burden of showing: (1) counsel's representation 
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) a 
reasonable probability that, but for the counsel's unprofessional 
errors the results of the proceeding would have been different. 
Id. 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 2067. The reasonable probability is a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. 
Id. at 2068, State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401 (Utah 1986) 
In a pre-Strickland case, the Utah Supreme Court set forth a 
usable objective standard of reasonableness in cases where trial 
counsel's pretrial preparation and investigation is challenged. 
The court recognized 
the vital distinction between those cases 
where counsel failed to make a careful, 
factual and legal investigation necessary for 
a constitutionally adequate defense and those 
wherein counsel, after making such an inves-
tigation, decides for tactical or strategic 
reasons, which from benefit of hindsight may 
appear wise or unwise, not to utilize the 
fruits of his labor. 
State v. McNichol, 554 P.2d at 203, 204 (Utah 1976). 
The McNichol "vital distinction" can be made in the instant 
case without difficulty. The record is replete with evidence of 
trial counsel's egregious failures of preparation and inves-
tigation. 
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A. Trial Counsel's Failure to Obtain and Examine Avail-
able, Material Evidence Critical to his Client's Main Defense 
Deprived the Defendant of the use of Exonerating Evidence at 
Trial and Amounted to Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. 
Trial counsel was informed at the outset of his representa-
tion in March, 1985, that defendant Crestanl's main defense was 
that he had deposited sufficient personal ffunds into MMD-2 to 
cover the alleged thefts. Trial counsel accepted a large fee on 
the grounds that much preparation, investigation and auditing of 
bank records would need to be accomplished prior to trial. Alta 
Title's former counsel and a former vice president offered their 
services to trial counsel to assist him in the crucial task of 
examining the records of MMD-2. 
Notwithstanding the instruction of his|client and the offer 
of help to do so, trial counsel made virtually no effort to 
examine the bank records prior to trial. Nearly two years after 
the preliminary hearing, trial counsel issued subpoenas for 
portions of the MMD-2 records for a four njonth period. This 
subpoena did not request any of the record^ covering the full 
time period involved in the state's charges.) 
counsel subpoenaed only deposit items and rjeglected to request 
withdrawals, monthly statements or other records of the account 
necessary to understand the transactions. 
Even this incomplete effort was rendelred nearly useless 
because trial counsel neglected to pay the bopying fees and the 
Additionally, trial 
records were subsequently lost and had to be reordered. Thus, 
even those pitifully few MMD-2 records so vitally needed were not 
acquired by trial counsel until two days before the trial. 
Trial counsel had other sources whereby he could have 
examined the MMD-2 records including the State's evidence itself. 
On several occasions the prosecutor offered to allow trial 
counsel to examine all of the records held by the State and even 
to supply an investigator to help explain the records. In the 
two year period between the preliminary hearing and trial, this 
offer was ignored. 
At trial, trial counsel attempted to establish defendant 
Crestani1s main defense without himself having a knowledge of the 
history of the account, without giving his primary witnesses the 
benefit of a refreshed recollection of the account, and without 
significant records to establish and corroborate their testimony. 
The results were predictable and devastating to the defense. 
After the trial, trial counsel was discharged and new 
counsel was hired. New counsel engaged the services of a Cer-
tified Public Accountant to perform the examination of the MMD-2 
records that Mr. Crestani had been assured would be done prior to 
trial. The results of that examination are contained in the two 
reports of Leland Martineau, CPA contained in the record. 
(Defendant's Exhibit 1-d, R at 302-304). 
In his abbreviated, one-week investigation, the CPA was able 
to establish that the amount of $24,662.50 which represented 
0£ 
funds due personally to Defendant Crestani were deposited into 
MMD-2 on June 28, 1982. The CPA found that those funds were in 
the account and available to cover the withdrawal in the amount 
of $16,500.00 on August 13, 1982, upon whicth Count 4 of the 
information was based. 
In addition, the CPA found that personal funds of the 
Defendant Crestani of at least $76,000.00 had been deposited by 
or for Defendant Crestani into MMD-2 in the period May through 
August, 1982, which period encompassed the charges in the infor-
mation. Though much of this was withdraw^ prior to the 
withdrawals charged in the information, using MMD-2 account 
records to give a context to the recollection of Mr. Crestani, 
the CPA found evidence that Mr. Crestani majf not have known of 
all of withdrawals. 
In addition, the CPA found that the sum of $50,000.00 that 
Defendant Crestani had directed be deposited into MMD-2 on 
August 5, 1982, was in fact deposited in another account main-
tained by Alta Title known as the Alta Titl0 Contract Servicing 
Account. The CPA found no evidence that thii money was withdrawn 
up to and including the time that Alta Titl^ ceased doing busi-
ness in March, 1983. This money was therefore available to be 
withdrawn or cover any overdrafts of the Defendant's personal 
funds in MMD-2. This evidence further establishes the likelihood 
that Defendant Crestani may have reasonably believed that that 
money was available to cover withdrawals of funds from the 
account. 
It appears clear that defense counsel's utter failure to 
perform any significant pretrial investigation of the relevant 
records of the MMD-2 account fell far below the minimum objective 
standards of reasonable representation required by the Strickland 
test. Far worse however, is the fact that trial counsel's 
ignorance of the contents of the MMD-2 records prevented Defen-
dant Crestani from presenting evidence at trial that would have 
surely exonerated him under count four of the information and 
would have substantially supported the defenses to the remaining 
counts. 
Under the circumstance presented in this case, trial coun-
sel's failure to investigate, in the face of repeated pleas from 
his client presents, one of the most blatant cases of ineffective 
assistance of counsel imaginable. Nor can trial counsel's 
failure be excused as mere error in strategy. 
From his opening argument, and through his interrogation of 
witnesses and his closing comments to the jury, trial counsel 
attempted vainly to establish Defendant Crestani's main defense. 
It is clear that he relied heavily on the very defense that his 
failure of preparation prevented him from establishing. The 
circumstances surrounding trial counsel's belated, hurried and 
error-ridden preparation belie any claim that he intentionally 
avoided for tactical reasons a full investigation of the MMD-2 
account. 
B. Trial Counsel's Additional Failure^ of Investigation of 
Facts and Preparation of Witnesses Additionally Damaged His 
Ability to Present a Defense and Amounted to Ineffective Assis-
tance of Counsel. 
Although the inexcusable and almost unbelievable failure of 
defense is serious 
•I » 
trial counsel to prepare his client's main 
enough to require reversal by itself, counsel's lack of diligence 
in other aspects of trial preparation is evident throughout the 
record and can be illustrated by the following points: 
1. Trial counsel did virtually no preparation for trial 
during the nearly two years between the preliminary hearing and 
trial. He relegated what preparation was done to an inexperi-
enced paralegal and did not open his files utitil two days prior 
to trial. In addition, during that time trial counsel avoided 
contact or communication with the Defendant s\.nd the key witnesses 
in the case. 
2. Trial counsel apparently began his preparation for this 
four-day trial two days before the trial actually began. He 
contacted the key witnesses over the phone and his preparation of 
those witnesses was cursory and misguided, we began his prepara-
tion of the Defendant for his testimony the night before trial 
and deflected anxious questions about his trial preparation with 
hollow assurances. He never told Defendant's wife that she would 
be a witness until 3 days into the trial. In| fact, he apparently 
did not intend to call her since he did not identify her to the 
jury as a potential witness despite the fact that she had been in 
charge of escrow accounts and had made key deposits in MMD-2. 
3. Trial counsel's attempt to subpoena bank records crucial 
to his clients defense was woefully incomplete and sloppily 
handled. 
4. Trial counsel failed to perform other crucial inves-
tigation that resulted in the lack of needed evidence at trial. 
For example, he failed to obtain documentary evidence that James 
Crestani was entitled to agency fees paid by the Bajan partner-
ships amounting to hundreds of thousands of dollars. In addition 
he failed to interview and subpoena a key witness (Blake Hammond) 
who would have given testimony discrediting the prosecution's 
only accountant witness (Roger Piburn). (Affidavit of Blake 
Hammond R at 200-203). 
Counsel's duty to investigate facts and interview witnesses 
possessing relevant information exists whether or not counsel 
believes his client's claims. Jennings v. State, 744 P.2d 212 
(Okl. Cr. 1987) 
When counsel knows of the existence of a 
person or persons who possess information 
relevant to his client's defense, and he 
fails to use due diligence to investigate 
that evidence, such a lack of industry cannot 
be justified as "strategic error". 
Id. at 214. Citation omitted. 
The predictable and tragic consequence of trial counsel's 
lack of preparation was painfully evident at trail. Witnesses 
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rebuttal evidence 
prosecutor to argue 
were asked to testify from memory as to specific deposits made 
over five years prior to trial. Few documents were available to 
substantiate their testimony. In addition, 
presented by the State, of which trial counsel and his witnesses 
were unaware, effectively destroyed their testimony and their 
credibility before the jury and allowed the 
that the Defendant and his witnesses were attempting to "pull the 
wool over the [jury's] eyes". 
C. There Exists at Least a Reasonably Probability that, 
but for Trial Counsel's Unprofessional Errors, the Result of the 
Trial Would Have Been Different. 
The second prong of the Strickland test! requires a deter-
mination as to whether or not the result at trial would have been 
different had it not been for trial counsel's below-standard 
representation. As the court in Strickland stated 
The benchmark for judging any claim of 
ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's 
conduct so undermined the proper functioning 
of the adversarial process that trie trial 
cannot be relied on as having produced a just 
result. 
Strickland at 2064. The Utah Supreme Court 
further defined the standards to be met by a 
assistance of counsel. 
Defendant must prove what specific, iden-
tified acts or omissions fall outside the 
wide range of professionally competent 
assistance. The claim may not be specula-
tive, but must be a demonstrative reality, 
citing Strickland 
Iclaim of ineffective 
_01 _ 
sufficient to overcome the strong presumption 
that counsel rendered adequate assistance and 
exercised "reasonable professional judgment11 
• • • • 
Furthermore, any deficiency must be prejudi-
cial to defendant. It is not enough to claim 
that the alleged errors had some conceivable 
effect on the outcome or could have had a 
prejudicial effect on the fact finders 
However, these principles are not applied as 
a mechanical test, but are guides to the 
ultimate focus upon the fundamental fairness 
the proceeding challenged. The purpose of 
the inquiry is simply to ensure the defendant 
receives a fair trial. 
State v. Frame, 823 P.2d 401, 404 (Utah 1986). 
Applying the above standards to this case, it is clear that 
trial counselfs preparation fell well below the minimum level of 
his duty to his client. Further, it is clear beyond any 
speculation that had trial counsel performed an adequate 
investigation of MMD-2, the jury verdict as to count four would 
have been completely different. 
It is also clear that had the Defendant and his wife been 
able to refresh their recollections as to the sequence of depos-
its and withdrawals from MMD-2, they would likely not have been 
made out to look like liars in front of the jury. 
In addition, it is probable that had the jury heard the 
evidence of tens of thousands of dollars of deposits of the 
Defendant's personal funds into MMD-2 before and after August 13, 
1982 and to other accounts of Alta Title, they would have felt 
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very differently about the elements of unauthorized control and 
intent to permanently deprive. 
It is apparent that the jury was concerned about this issue 
from its note to the court during deliberations. The note asked 
the question "Was the money 16,500.00 put bkck into MMD-2" The 
court's very appropriate response "refer to your collective 
memories", was probably not very helpful to the jury because of 
the lack of specific evidence presented at trial as to the 
deposits of the Defendant's personal funds into MMD-2 after 
August 13, 1982. Had this evidence been knpwn to trial counsel 
and presented to the jury, the probability exists that the jury 
would have found a lack of sufficient evidence to support the 
element of intent to permanently deprive. 
The other failures of preparation of investigation itemized 
above, when combined with the prejudicial efffect of the uncharged 
misconduct evidence and the misleading and 
structions (discussed infra), had a cumulatively devastating 
effect on Defendant Crestani's defense. Viewing all of these 
factors there is a serious question whether 
be relied on as having produced a just resulj:, 
II. 
TRIAL COUNSEL'S REPRESENTATION AT tRIAL FELL 
BELOW THE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD AND AMOUNTED 
TO INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
Given trial counsel's inadequate trial preparation described 
confusing jury in-
br not the trial can 
above it is no surprise that trial counsel was frustrated in 
nearly every attempt to establish an effective defense. Trial 
counsel's hapless attempts through various witnesses on direct 
examination to reconstruct financial transactions without com-
plete records or adequate witness preparation were easily im-
peached. 
Trial counsel's cross-examination of the State's witnesses 
also suffered from his lack of preparation. Unarmed with a 
thorough knowledge of his case or with the documents from MMD-2 
to prove his position, counsel resorted to arguing with the 
State's witnesses. 
Another devastating blow to the defense occurred because of 
trial counsel's failure to object to the admission of irrelevant 
and highly prejudicial evidence. The prosecutor continually 
elicited, without objection, testimony that MMD-2 was an interest 
bearing escrow account, that Defendant co-mingled his personal 
monies with escrow funds and that Alta Title Company kept the 
interest earned on the escrow funds. The State also attempted to 
question a witness using the text of a civil statute which 
prohibited the co-mingling of personal funds with escrow funds 
and required that any interest paid on such account be disbursed 
to the escrow owners and not to the title company. (T. Vol. Ill, 
p. 355) Trial counsel initially objected to reference to this 
misleading and dangerous piece of evidence. Later, however, 
trial counsel himself offered the rejected exhibit and it was 
admitted.(T. Vol. IV, pp. 492, 493). 
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Evidence of uncharged misconduct ffis not admissible to prove 
the character of a person in order to show that he acted in 
conformity therewith." Utah Rules of Evidence 404(b). The 
courts have long recognized that evidence ot misconduct other 
than that charged is highly prejudicial. Such evidence should 
not be admitted unless it is probative of an issue in the case 
and the probative value out weighs the prejudicial nature of the 
evidence. Rule 403 Utah Rules of Evidence. In this case 
evidence that Defendant co-mingled his own monies in the MMD-2 
account in violation of a civil statute has no bearing whatever 
on the State's theft charges. Thus, it follows that the evidence 
of the civil statute was not probative and in fact, it was not 
even relevant to the case. Irrelevant evidence is not admissi-
ble. Utah Rules of Evidence 402. 
An accused is entitled to be tried only 
charged with committing. State v. Lopez, 626 
1981). Accordingly, the State should not 
"besmirch, disgrace or prejudice the defendant in the eyes of the 
jury" by evidence of unrelated misconduct. State v. Gibson, 565 
P.2d 783, 786 (Utah 1977). See also State v| 
539, 547 (Utah 1983) 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized phe importance of 
case. In State v. 
for the acts he is 
P.2d 483, 485 (Utah 
be allowed to 
raising appropriate objections in a criminal 
Gray, 601 P.2d 918, 920 (Utah 1979). The Cc^ urt observed that 
competent counsel is 
Tanner, 675 P.2d 
oc 
"one who will take such actions and present 
whatever defenses and interpose whatever objections he 
can in honesty anH good conscience justify In tEe 
interest of his client." 
Although counsel is not required to object when doing so would 
futile, State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56, 59 (Utah 1982), it is 
clear in the case at bar that an objection to this irrelevant and 
prejudicial evidence would have been well taken and should have 
been made. 
Trial counsel's failure to object to the irrelevant and 
prejudicial evidence and argument regarding alleged violations of 
the civil statute was conduct falling below a reasonable standard 
of competency. The prejudicial nature of this evidence creates a 
reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different 
if it had been disallowed. 
III. 
THE TRIM, COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTIONS 
TO THE JURY THAT WERE MISLEADING 
AND UNFAIRLY PREJUDICIAL 
The purpose of jury instructions is to enlighten, rather 
than confuse. If follows that: 
11
 [instructions should be clear, explicit, and free 
from ambiguities and contradictions; otherwise they may 
confuse and mislead the jury.11 
Scaggs v. State, 417 P.2d 331, 336 (Okl. Cr. 1966). If in a 
criminal case erroneous instructions might have influenced the 
jury's deliberations they are deemed prejudicial and the judgment 
should be reversed. Id. 
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The Recitation in the Instructions 
Forbidding Acts with which Defendant was not 
of a Civil Statute 
Charged was Prejudi-
cial Error, 
The Court's instructions to the jury included the following: 
Instruction No. 16 
You are instructed that the 1 
State of Utah applicable at the 
times in this case provide that 
insurance agent may engage in th^ 
settlement or closing business, 
combination of such business, and 
escrow, settlement or closing agenjt 
that all funds deposited with the 
connection with any escrow, sett 
closing shall be deposited in a 
separate trust account, or account 
funds shall be the property of the 
persons entitled thereto under the 
of the escrow, settlement or cloi 
segregate [sic] escrow by escrow, 
by settlement, or closing by clos 
records of the agent. These funds 
be subject to any debt of the agentt 
be used only to fulfill the term^ 
individual escrow, settlement or 
under which the funds were accepte 
of the funds shall be used until 
tions of the escrow, settlement 
have been met. 
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Any interest received or fund^ deposited 
with the agent in connection with kny escrow, 
settlement or closing which are deposited in 
a bank shall be paid over to the 4ePositing 
party to the escrow, settlement o± closing 
and shall not be transferred to th|e account 
of the agent. 
R at 140. This instruction quotes selected 
Ann. §31-25-26 (1981) which was in effect 
Instruction 16 is seriously misleading, 
highlights and draws the jury's attention to 
port ions of Utah Code 
during 1982. 
Instruction 16 
allegations of civil 
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misconduct with which the Defendant was not charged and which, 
even if proved, was irrelevant to the theft charges. The preju-
dicial effect of Instruction 16 was compounded by its placement 
in the instructions immediately before the four theft instruc-
tions. R at 140-144. The implication in the instruction that 
allegations of misconduct involving the escrow account had 
anything to do with proof of the charged crimes is contrary to 
law and simply unfair. 
Although, in some circumstances, a court may instruct the 
jury using statutory language, this is proper only if the 
instruction is confined to the issues in the case and does not 
mislead the jury. Day v. Goodwin, 3 Wash. App. 940, 944, 478 
P.2d 774, 777 (1970). Abstract statements of the law, however 
correct, should not be given in jury instructions unless they are 
geared to the issues in the case being tried. Gill v. People, 
139 Colo. 401, 412, 339 P.2d 1000, 1006 (Colo. 1959). 
The issue of compliance with §31-25-26 has nothing to do 
with the issue of whether or not the Defendant committed the 
charges of theft. The issue of compliance was therefore not 
properly before the jury. However, because of the tactics and 
argument of the prosecutor and the inclusion of Instruction 16, 
the jury was surely mislead into believeing that the issue of 
compliance somehow was probative evidence of theft. Because of 
this misleading instruction, it is likely that the jury 
erroneously viewed Defendant's alleged failure to comply with 
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§31-25-26 as evidence of his guilt on the tqheft charges. The 
prosecutor improperly compounded that likelihood by continually 
eliciting testimony that Defendant co-mingled funds and that he 
did not pay interest to the escrow owners and by focusing on the 
claims in his closing argument. The combination of these factors 
surely poisoned the attitude of the jury toward the Defendant and 
tainted the verdict. 
Other courts have recognized this dangler. In State v. 
Leonard, 292 S.C. 133, 355 S.E.2d 270, 272 I (S.C. 1987), the 
defendant was convicted of reckless homicide. On appeal, the 
South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the conviction on several 
grounds. One of the errors the Court noted was that the trial 
court, in its instructions to the jury, quoted verbatim a statute 
with which the defendant had not been charged. The South 
Carolina Supreme Court noted that the quoted language did not 
enlighten the jury regarding the issues to be| 
held that when 
decided. The Court 
the inclusion of [a] non-charged offense has 
the effect of confusing the issues the jury 
must determine, the statute should not be 
read to the jury. 
Id. at 273. 
Instruction 16 was unnecessary, irrelevant and prejudicial 
to the Defendant's right to a fair trial before an impartial 
jury. 
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B. Instruction Number 25 Prejudiced the Defendant's Right 
to Require the State to Prove Each Element of the Offense Beyond 
a Reasonable Doubt. 
The court's charge to the jury included the following 
instruction: 
Instruction No. 25 
You are instructed that if you find that 
the MMD-2 Account was used as an escrow 
account then the Defendant had no authority 
to use the funds of another for his own use. 
Instruction No. 25 is logically flawed and legally wrong. 
However, even more serious than that, the insidious effect of the 
instruction is to establish an irrebuttable presumption of the 
truth of a contested element of the charged offenses. 
Instruction No. 25 was simply the last and most serious of the 
prosecutor's misguided attempts to convict the Defendant of theft 
based upon evidence of unrelated and improper use of an escrow 
account. 
The logical problem with the instruction is that it sets up 
a false syllogism. It is simply not true that the lack of 
Defendantfs authority to use the funds of another flows automat-
ically from the fact that MMD-2 may have ever been used as an 
escrow account. The account may have also been used to maintain 
the un-escrowed funds of Defendant's wife. The account was 
certainly used for the funds of Alta Title. Because the owner of 
that the fact the 
eliminates the pos-
the funds withdrawn by the Defendant was nfever established at 
trial, the funds could have been funds belonging to a person or 
entity that gave authority to the Defendant for their use. 
The problem is that Defendant never claimed at trial that he 
used the funds of another. His defense was that he withdrew his 
own funds from the account. Therefore, Instruction 25 seems to 
have no relevance to the issues in the case. 
Because the Defendant may or may not hive had authority to 
use the funds of another in the MMD-2 accounjt it is logically and 
legally incorrect and prejudicial to imply 
account was ever used as an escrow account 
sibility of authority whether or not the fiinds withdrawn were 
escrowed funds. 
The most ominous implication that can be drawn from this 
Instruction is that it eliminates the requirement that the State 
prove the element of lack of authorization beyond a reasonable 
doubt. The Instruction can be read to mean] 
Instruction 16, that if the account was usedj 
then even the Defendant's money became "funds 
mere fact they were deposited into this account and the Defendant 
somehow automatically lost the authority thereafter to use them 
as his own. 
It may be that the Instruction was meant to say that if the 
Defendant withdr ew escrowed funds from MMD-2 then the jury is 
instructed to find he had no authority to do so. Of course, even 
in connection with 
as an escrow account 
s of another11 by the 
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this statement is legally and factually incorrect and would have 
the effect of unlawfully shifting the burden of proof on the 
issue of authorization to the Defendant. If the State proved 
that Defendant withdrew escrowed funds, it would have to prove 
that Defendant had no permission to do so. 
No matter how it is read, Instruction 25 allows the jury to 
logically link the finding of no authority to a finding that 
MMD-2 was used as an escrow account. Such an instruction vio-
lates the Defendant's right to due process. 
Due process requires the State to prove "every ingredient of 
an offense beyond a reasonable doubt . . . .ff Patterson v. New 
York, 432 U.S. 197, 215, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 2329 (1977). ,f[A] jury's 
verdict cannot stand if the instructions . . . . do not require 
it to find each element of the crime under the proper standard of 
proof . . . ." Cabana v. Bullock, U.S. , 106 S.Ct. 689, 696 
(1986). 
Because the main contested issue in the case was whether or 
not the money was the property of another withdrawn without 
authority, the instruction is in effect an instruction for a 
directed verdict. 
In People vs. Figueroa, 41 Cal. 3d 714, 715 P.2d 680, 686, 
(1986), the Court recognized that a jury instruction may have the 
effect of a directed verdict although not stated in so many 
words. 
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The prohibition against directed ver-
dicts "includes perforce situations in which 
the Judge's instructions fall short of 
directing a guilty verdict but which never-
theless have the effect of so doing by 
eliminating other relevant considerations if 
the jury finds one fact to be true.'1 
Citing United States v. Hayward, 420 F.2d [L42, 144 (D.C. Cir. 
1969). 
In the case at bar, Instruction 25 tells the jury that upon 
a finding that MMD-2 was ever used as an escrow account any 
withdrawal of MMD-2 monies by Defendant was without authority 
even if the monies withdrawn were not escrowed monies. 
This instruction in effect commands the Jury to ignore the 
evidence that Defendant had authority to withdraw funds, or that 
he withdrew his own funds. 
The instruction is so insidious in effect that by itself it 
casts doubt upon the fairness of the jury's Iverdict. 
C. The Combined Effect of Instructions 16 and 25 was to 
Grossly Confuse the Issues and Mislead the Jury. Either Instruc-
tion 16 or Instruction 25, taken alone, would constitute revers-
ible error in this case. These two instructions taken together 
have the perverse synergistic effect of moile than doubling the 
prejudice of either instruction alone. 
On one hand, the jury was subject to ai Darrage of evidence 
and argument to the effect that the Defendant co-mingled personal 
monies with escrow funds. The jury was then instructed that it 
is illegal to co-mingle personal and escrow bonies. Finally, the 
jury was given an instruction implying that withdrawal of money 
from an escrow account without more established the element of 
unauthorized control for the purpose of the theft charge. 
The apparent purpose of this coordinated attack was to 
convince the jury that the alleged misuse of the escrow account 
was some how connected with, and required conviction on, the 
charges of theft. The probability is great that this abusive and 
unfairly prejudicial tactic worked. The likelihood is high that 
the combined effect of these two instructions was to justify the 
conviction of the Defendant, not on the evidence of theft, but on 
the basis of the prejudicial flood of uncharged misconduct 
evidence. 
IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE A 
SPECIFIC INTENT INSTRUCTION 
Defendant offered four instructions on specific intent. (R 
at 106, 117, 118, 125) These are reproduced as Exhibit 2 in the 
Addendum for convenience of the Court. The Court's charge to the 
jury, however, included none of these instructions. 
Because theft is a specific intent crime, a defendant is 
entitled to an instruction on specific intent; An instruction on 
general intent alone is inadequate. People v. Mingo, 181 Colo. 
390, 392, 509 P.2d 800, 801 (Colo. 1973). Since specific intent 
is an element of the crime, it must be proved beyond a reasonable 
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doubt. People v. Erickson, 695 P.2d 804, 8(j)5 (Colo. App. 1985); 
State v. Anderson, 102 Idaho 464, 466, 63^ . P.2d 1223, 1225 
(1981). Accordingly, the jury should be instructed regarding the 
meaning of specific intent and the State's burden of proof. 
In State v. Bachicha, 84 N.M. 397, 503 P.2d 1175 (N.M. App. 
1972) , the defendant was tried on the charjge of theft of an 
automobile. In the court's instructions to the jury, the charg-
ing statute was quoted: "Any person who sh^ll take any vehicle 
intentionally and without consent of the ovrhor thereof shall be 
guilty of a felony." j^ d. at 1175. An additional instruction 
read as follows: 
You are instructed that the intent! with which 
an act is done is a mental procesis and, as 
such, generally remains hidden within the 
mind where it was conceived and is seldom, if 
ever, susceptible of proof by direct evi-
dence, but must be inferred and established 
by the acts, conduct and doings of the 
persons having such intent and from the facts 
and circumstances surrounding such acts, 
conduct and doings, and in determining the 
intent with which the defendant in this case 
committed the act or acts charged in this 
indictment, if you find that he diki so, it is 
proper for you to consider his acts, conduct 
and doings, together with all othejr facts and 
circumstances proved on the trialj of this 
case. 
Id. at 1176. The State claimed that the twb instructions, when 
read together, adequately instructed the jury on criminal intent. 
The appellate court found, however, that the instructions were 
insufficient to inform the jury of the importance of the element 
of intent. The court observed that lf[t]he jjury must have more 
than a suggestion. It must be instructed on the essential 
element of a 'conscious wrongdoing.f" Id. 
As in Bachicha, the court's instructions in the case at bar 
gave the jury no more than a suggestion. The elements in-
structions superficially address intent by the use of "purpose to 
deprive" language. (R at 141, 142, 143, 144) Instruction 15 
offers a definition of intent using language similar to that 
offered in Bachicha. Nowhere does the court define specific 
intent nor does it inform the jury of the importance of specific 
intent as an element which must be proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
The court was offered an instruction defining specific 
intent and distinguishing it from general intent. (R at 118) 
Counsel also offered the court three additional specific intent 
instructions any one of which would have satisfied the require-
ments of Bachicha. (R at 106, 117, 125) The court's failure to 
instruct on this important element left the jury utterly without 
direction. 
The element of specific intent is extremely crucial in the 
instant case since Defendant's defense was based in part on the 
fact that he had no intent to permanently deprive anyone of the 




This record provides overwhelming evidence of trial 
counsel's lack of effective and necessary preparation and 
investigation and the resultant unavailability of evidence 
establishing good defenses to the charges. The problem was 
exacerbated by the admission of extremely prejudicial and 
inadmissible evidence at trial and misleading, prejudicial and 
unlawful instructions to the jury. These fjactors combined to 
allow an unjust conviction of this defendant in what must be 
described as a gross miscarriage of justice^ These errors may 
only be remedied by a new trial. 
Defendant Crestani requests that this Court grant him that 
remedy. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DATED this day of April, 1988. 
SESSIONS & MO^ )RE 
JOHN F. CLARK 
JOHN K. WEST 
Attorneys for Defendant Crestani 
_ / , 7 _ 
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ADDENDUM EXHIBIT A 
t 
A(jA~ ~¥/f Art"'* /(k s~zo 
fi^~> ^ T^ ^^^^ 
ADDENDUM EXHIBIT B 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
To constitute the crime ^ charged in the information there 
must be the joint operation of two essential Elements, an act 
forbidden by law and an intent to do the act. 
Before a defendant may be found guilty o£ a crime the 
prosecution must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that under 
the statute described in these instructions defendant was forbidden 
to do the acts charged in the information, and that he specifically 
intended to commit those acts. 
As stated before, the law never imposes upon a defendant 
in a criminal case the burden or duty of calling any witnesses or 
producing any evidence. He has no burden of prfoof whatsoever. 
oooi 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
In the case of c e r t a i n crimes i t i s r iecessary t h a t i n 
a d d i t i o n to the in t ended ac t which c h a r a c t e r i s e s t h e o f f ense , t h e 
ac t must be accompanied by a s p e c i f i c o r p a r t i c u l a r i n t e n t wi thout 
which such crime may not be committed. 
Thus, in t he crimes of t h e f t such as are charged i n t h e 
in format ion of t h i s c a s e , a necessa ry element M t h e e x i s t e n c e i n 
t h e mind of the defendant of t he s p e c i f i c i n t e n t to o b t a i n o r 
e x e r c i s e unau thor ized c o n t r o l of t he p rope r ty fyf t he persons named 
in each count x>7ith a purpose to depr ive t h e owitier t h e r e o f . 
And, un less such s p e c i f i c i n t e n t so e x i s t s , t h e crimes 
charged were not committed. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
"Spec i f i c in ten t 1 1 means t h a t i n t e n t fwhich i s p r e c i s e l y 
formulated and i s d i s t i n g u i s h e d from a l l othetr i n t e n t s , t h a t i t 
i s d e f i n i t e , p a r t i c u l a r , r e s t r i c t e d , e x p l i c i t ] , exac t , l i m i t e d , -
andthe oppos i t e of gene ra l i n t e n t . 
nnOli8 
INSTRUCTION NO. > 7, 
The crime charged against the defendant in th i s case 
i s a serious crime which requires proof of speci f ic in t en t before 
the defendant can be convicted. Specific interi t , as the term 
inp l i e s , means more than the general in ten t tc commit the act . 
To es tab l i sh specif ic in ten t the prosecution nu^st prove tha t the 
defendant knowlingly did an act which the law forbids, or knowingly 
fa i led to do an act which the law requi res , purposely intending 
to v io la t e the law. Such in t en t may be ctetermi]ned from a l l of 
the facts and circumstances surrounding the cas^. 
An act or fa i lu re to ac t i s ?lknowingljyff dene, i f dene 
voluntar i ly and in ten t ional ly , and not because )f mistake or 
accident or other innocent reason. 
